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Cargo: Terceiro Secretário da Carreira de Diplomata

PROVA ESCRITA DE INGLÊS

Na prova a seguir, faça o que se pede, usando, caso julgue necessário, as páginas correspondentes do caderno de rascunho. Em seguida, transcreva os textos para as respectivas folhas do CADERNO DE TEXTOS DEFINITIVOS, nos locais apropriados, pois não serão avaliados fragmentos de texto escritos em locais indevidos. Respeite os limites mínimos e máximos de palavras estabelecidos.

ATENÇÃO! Nas folhas do caderno de textos definitivos, identifique-se apenas na capa, pois não serão avaliados os textos que tenham qualquer assinatura ou marca identificadora fora do local apropriado.

EXAMINADORES:

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PART 1 – Translation A

Translate the following passage into English:

As contradições do sistema colonial têm de comum unicamente isto: refletem a desagregação do sistema e brotam dele. Veremos brancos lutar com pretos e mulatos contra o preconceito de cor; mulatos e pretos, com os brancos, a favor dele; portugueses contra a metrópole, e brasileiros a favor. A aparência ilógica e incongruente dos fatos não só torna difícil sua interpretação como constitui a razão da dubiedade e incerteza que apresentam todas as situações semelhantes. Dubiedade e incerteza que estão nos próprios fatos, e que nenhum artifício de explicação pode desfazer. Os fatos claros, em seu conjunto e definidos, só vêm em seguida, quando tais situações amadurecem. Inútil procurá-los antes, torcendo os acontecimentos ao gosto particular do observador. É o movimento eterno da História, do Homem e de todas as coisas que não pára e não cessa, e que nós, com os pobres instrumentos de compreensão e de expressão que possuímos, não apanhamos e sobretudo não podemos reproduzir senão numa parcela ínfima, cortes desajeitados numa realidade que não se define estática, e sim dinamicamente.

Caio Prado Junior. Formação do Brasil Contemporâneo. São Paulo: Brasiliense/Publifolha, 2000 (com adaptações).

PART 1 – Translation B

Translate the following passage from João Guimarães Rosa's "O Espelho" into English:

O senhor, que estuda, suponho nem tenha idéia do que seja na verdade — um espelho? Demais das noções de física, com que se familiarizou, as leis da ótica. Reporto-me ao transcendente. Tudo, aliás, é a ponta de um mistério. Inclusive, os fatos. Ou a ausência deles. Duvida? Quando nada acontece, há um milagre que não estamos vendo. Fixemo-nos no concreto. O espelho, são muitos, captando-lhe as feições; todos refletem-lhe o rosto, e o senhor crê-se com aspecto próprio e praticamente imudado, do qual lhe dão imagem fiel. Mas — que espelho? Há-os "bons" e "maus", os que favorecem e os que detraem; e os que são apenas honestos, pois não. E onde situar o nível dessa honestidade? Como é que o senhor, eu, os restantes próximos, somos, no visível? O senhor dirá: as fotografias o comprovam. Respondo: que, além de prevalecerem para as lentes das máquinas objeções análogas, seus resultados apóiam antes que desmentem a minha tese, tanto revelam superporem-se aos dados iconográficos os índices do mistério. Ainda que tirados de imediato um após outro, os retratos sempre serão entre si muito diferentes. Se nunca atentou nisso, é porque vivemos, de modo incorrigível, distraídos das coisas mais importantes.

Primeiras Estórias, 12.^a ed. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1981 (com adaptações).

PART 2 – SUMMARY

Read the following text and in your own words summarise it in up to 200 words.

Summit meetings can have their drawbacks. The assumption that personal acquaintances between the leaders of states will forestall future conflicts has often been gainsaid by history. Summits that peacefully negotiated the settlement of conflicts seldom produced outcomes with long-term consequences. During the Cold War debate as to their value abounded. Some of the arguments fielded then still provide ammunition for critics today. How can the head of a democratic country deal successfully with the leader of a totalitarian system or dictatorship? With the main actors rooted in different cultures it is suggested that such encounters can but lead to shallow understandings. In the long term, they could actually deepen the divide. Heads of state are not experts in the highly complex matters that clutter summit agendas. They lack the diplomatic skills of professional diplomats and are often ill-prepared for these debates. Under pressure of time and the weight of expectations from the public at home, politicians are often tempted to compromise with false solutions. Since summit agreements are mostly not legally binding, statesmen do not even feel politically obliged to deliver. Critics also complain that calling summit meetings compels politicians and bureaucrats to set spurious priorities with respect to time, political resources, and energy. Nevertheless, most of these arguments can be countered. They have nothing to do with summits as such, but rather with the way these meetings are prepared and conducted as instruments of modern diplomacy.

The advantages of multilateral summitry cannot be easily measured in short-term tangible results. In the long haul, however, they certainly can render more than just an improved atmosphere for international political negotiation, although that is a value in itself if handled properly and used with the right political nous. Summit meetings have acquired new roles and special functions. From this standpoint, I want to argue that summits are an important element of international political negotiation and yield the following benefits. Personal contact between heads of state and government adds new factors to the equation of power. Military and economic might certainly count still, but the personality of a leader, the way he performs in debate, and the thrust of his intellect will be factored into the discussions at a summit meeting. This affords a chance to redress imbalances and to obtain results universally accepted as legitimate. After all, summitry is a democratic invention and not much to the liking of dictators.

Summit meetings have eminently practical effects. To prepare for a summit and avert failure, bureaucrats are constrained to set goals and time-frames for solutions that might otherwise have been stalled or shelved. Summits have a legitimizing function, nationally as well as internationally. Commitments undertaken by a political leader during a summit meeting can open up new avenues in domestic political debate or provide fresh opportunities to break deadlocks. On the other hand, an agreement or even a mere understanding on the interpretation of facts reached by several heads of state also has norm-setting qualities for the international community. Such guidelines not only bind the participating nations together in implementing their policies, but also set standards for others. To retain its useful role, however, the summit must evolve and be constantly subject to review. One expedient reform would address the problem of how to stem or reverse the current trend toward ever larger, more elaborate summits.

These meetings can and should be reduced in size, the numbers of aides and fellow participants slashed and more strenuous efforts made to muffle the media spectacle surrounding the event itself. It has become fashionable to demand greater participation by NGOs in the summit process. This is tantamount to insinuating that heads of state are out of tune with the public and not liable to democratic domestic control. The rights and duties of such organizations should be carefully defined, though. Certainly, it might help if state and non-state actors work more closely together in the future than they have to date. Finally, it sometimes makes sense to have the broadest political participation by all states. But opening up each summit can also exact a price, impairing States' capacity to act. Likewise, if outcomes merely reflect the least common denominator, they will prove hollow. Legitimacy is not just a question of numbers. If these considerations are heeded, summits have a bright future. In today's world, "summitry belongs to the dramaturgy of globalism which in turn pertains to the future of world politics."

Adapted from Peter Weilemann's "The Summit Meeting: The Role and Agenda of Diplomacy at its Highest Level". In: NIRA Review. Spring 2000.
(20 marks)

PART 3 – COMPOSITION

Length: 350 to 450 words

Read the following text on Diplomacy and Democracy and, in the light of it and any of the ideas raised in the texts in Parts 1 & 2 above, assess the benefits and drawbacks of public diplomacy (in which media exposure enhances the emotional dimension) as compared with diplomacy as a rational, technical activity entrusted to specialists.

Alexis de Tocqueville wrote as follows in his classic 1835 book *Democracy in America*, defining a problem of democratic governance that is as old as the Greeks: "Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which are peculiar to a democracy; they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which it is deficient. A democracy can only with great difficulty regulate the details of an important undertaking, persevere in a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy or await their consequences with patience." The problem Tocqueville examined then has become far more acute now. Public awareness has increased and the media are far more intrusive. But neither has kept pace with the growing complexity of foreign policy issues. No country can or should, for instance, join the World Trade Organisation (WTO) without the people's support. How few of them, though, know or can know enough to form an opinion on the issue? The dilemma persists because it is inherent in a democracy — the volatility and power of public opinion and the weaknesses of democratic leadership. Not seldom, the preference of the majority is at odds with the requirements of sound policy, domestic or foreign. Not seldom an issue of foreign policy arouses the people from the slumber that is the norm, to shake them with paroxysms of moral outrage. Few are the leaders who have the moral fibre, the political skill and the intellectual muscle required to explain such realities to them. Having ignored the rumblings, most opt for mere survival when the crisis bursts into the open.

Hans J. Morgenthau traces the dilemma to its roots — the statesman, as distinct from the common politician, has to reckon with considerations which the populace cannot grasp. "The statesman must think in terms of the national interest, conceived as power among other powers. The popular mind reasons in the simple moralistic and legalistic terms of absolute good and absolute evil. The statesman must take the long view, proceeding slowly and by detours, paying with small losses for great advantages; he must be able to temporise, to compromise, to bide his time. The popular mind wants quick results; it will sacrifice tomorrow's real benefit for today's apparent advantage. By a psychological paradox, the most vociferous and compromising representatives of what is least conducive to the successful conduct of foreign policy are generally politicians who in their own constituencies would not dream of acting the way they expect the framers of foreign policy to act... The daily routine of their political lives is devoid of those moral and intellectual qualities which they really admire, which to the public they pretend to possess, and which they wish they were able to practise... they make foreign policy over into a sort of fairy-land where virtue triumphs and vice is punished, where heroes fight for principle without

thought of consequence, and where the knight in shining armour comes to the succour of the ravished nation, taking the villain's life even though he might in the process lose his own." Leaders have four options. One is simply to sail with the wind of public opinion and treat public opinion polls as the supreme guide. The second is to educate public opinion in the realities of the times. A British diplomat, Lord Vansittart, sharply defined this age-old problem: "How to induce the unwilling to accept the unavoidable." The third option is to mislead and corrupt public opinion — and cite the result in defence of the official stand. The leader whips up the people to a frenzy of chauvinism and defends his intransigence as obedience to the people's will. The last option is to practise deception.

Adapted from A.G. Noorani's "Of diplomacy and democracy." Frontline, v. 18 - Issue 23, Nov. 10 - 23, 2001.
(50 marks)

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